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ABSTRACT: The well-known “Decentralization Theorem” (Oates, 1972) establishes the 
superiority of decentralized public provision over the centralized case, which is not so sensitive 
to the diversity of expenditure needs among territories. We test this hypothesis using a unique 
Spanish database that provides information on road and educational infrastructure investment 
and capital stocks by region both before and after the decentralization of such responsibilities. 
We find that investment in both categories is much more sensitive to regional output and to 
infrastructure users and costs when sub-central governments have the responsibility over such 
services.  
 
Key words: decentralization, growth, roads, human capital 
JEL codes: D72, H54, H72, H77, I20 
 
 
 
RESUMEN: El conocido "Teorema de la descentralización" (Oates, 1972) establece la 
superioridad de la provisión pública descentralizada en relación a la centralizada, pues ésta 
última no es tan sensible respecto de la diversidad de preferencias sobre los bienes y servicios 
públicos que pueden existir entre territorios. En este artículo, contrastamos esta hipótesis a partir 
de una muestra de datos que, por un lado, ofrece información sobre inversión en infraestructuras 
en carreteras y en educación y, por el otro, sobre los stocks regionales de capital antes y después 
de la descentralización de tales competencias de gasto. Los resultados del análisis demuestran 
que la inversión realizada en ambas categorías de gasto es mucho más sensible al output 
regional y a los costes y número de usuarios de los servicios respectivos cuando los gobiernos 
subcentrales tienen la competencia de inversión. 
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1. Introduction 
 
From a normative point of view, the diversity of preferences among regions is probably 
the best-known reason that recommends a decentralized structure of government. 
According to the so-called “Decentralization Theorem” (Oates, 1972), “in the absence 
of cost-savings from the centralized provision of a good and of inter-jurisdictional 
externalities, the level of welfare will always be at least as high (and typically higher) if 
Pareto-efficient levels of consumption are provided in each jurisdiction than if any 
single uniform level of consumption is maintained across all jurisdictions” (p. 54). 
However, note that, for this prescription to hold, it is necessary to assume that the 
central government is not able to differentiate its provision among regions. Oates (1999) 
justifies it by means of the supposed better knowledge of state and local governments 
about the preferences and economic conditions of their constituency. Without that 
precise knowledge, and just having an “average” description of the preferences and 
economic conditions of all the citizens of the federation, the central government is 
“forced” to provide a uniform level of public goods across all the territories. 
 
Nevertheless, why could not a central layer of government make an effort to achieve the 
same level of information than sub-central governments? Seabright (1996) and Cremer 
et al. (1996) have probably been the first papers to try to answer this question. The 
former considers that the power assigned by voters to politicians is part of an 
incomplete contract, where actions adopted by the latter are not verifiable. Given this, 
the only way to punish a politician is by means of elections. Then, in comparison with 
the decentralized case, a central government has fewer incentives to collect all the 
information concerning a particular constituency and to make full use of it, due to the 
relatively small electoral weight of that region in the federal election process. Similarly, 
Cremer et al. (1996) consider the information acquisition process as endogenous, being 
the incentives of sub-central government to gather information greater than those of the 
central one. More recently, Lockwood (2002) and Besley and Coate (2003) have 
provided structural political economy models of both the central and sub-central 
decision-making processes. In both papers, the decisions adopted by the central 
government –which can imply diversity across territories– and their relative efficiency 
with respect to those adopted in the decentralized scenario crucially depend on how the 
central legislature works.  
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Hence, the theoretical literature has developed what seems to be a consistent framework 
to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of decentralization. Despite this, it is 
surprising that there are virtually no formal tests of the hypotheses that derive from the 
“Decentralization Theorem”. Remarkable exceptions to this rule are the papers by 
Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee (2002) and Faguet (2004). The first paper tests whether 
the degree of heterogeneity is a determinant of the allocation of responsibilities among 
sub-central governments, confirming this hypothesis in the case of the liquor control in 
the US states. That is, the States with more heterogeneous preferences have been more 
prone to decentralize that responsibility at the local level of government. The paper by 
Faguet (2004) provides evidence that decentralization increased the responsiveness of 
various public investment categories to local needs in Bolivia. 
 
Given their scarcity, more empirical analyses seem to be necessary to check the 
robustness of the results obtained. This is precisely our aim. We test whether the 
decentralization of the provision of public infrastructures in Spain has improved the 
efficiency in the allocation of investment funds. Our methodology consists of estimating 
an equation of the determinants of public investment in two main categories, Roads and 
Education, allowing the response of investment to its determinants – output, number of 
users, environmental cost factors and the political cloud of each region – to differ 
between regimens (i.e., centralized vs. decentralized provision). If the estimated 
coefficient of each investment determinant is the same in both regimes, we shall 
conclude that decentralization is not efficiency-enhancing. Otherwise, given the 
presumably better knowledge of expenditure needs by part of sub-central governments, 
investment decisions in the centralized case will not be optimal. 
 
This misallocation of public investment may adversely impact regional growth. The link 
between better responsiveness to regional needs and economic growth was pointed out 
by  
Oates (1993), who stated that “there surely are strong reasons, in principle, to believe 
that policies formulated for the provision of infrastructures and even human capital that 
are sensitive to regional or local conditions are likely to be more effective in 
encouraging economic development than centrally determined policies that ignore these 
geographical differences” (p. 240). That is, a priori, the greater responsiveness to local 
needs makes decentralization the institutionally efficient solution, that is, the one that 
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maximizes economic growth1. That statement has helped us to select the two inputs used 
in the analysis (Roads and Education), which impact on growth has also been 
recognized by the literature (see, e.g., Afonso et al., 2005, and Wöβmann, 2003). 
Moreover, some authors have suggested that the central government chooses an 
inefficient mix of roads and education. For example, De la Fuente et al. (2003) show 
that the social return of infrastructure investment (including roads) exceeds that on 
human capital in the richer Spanish regions, but the reverse is true in most of the poorer 
territories. From this finding, in order to increase the global effectiveness of regional 
policies, they conclude that a greater amount of education funds should be allocated to 
poorer regions, while redirecting part of the infrastructure resources towards richer 
areas2. 
 
The Spanish case provides a good chance to test the hypothesis that sub-central 
governments are more responsive to regional needs of public inputs than the central 
government, at least for two reasons. Firstly, Spain has suffered an important process of 
fiscal decentralization since the re-establishment of democracy and the approval of the 
Constitution in 19783. The timing of decentralization has not been equal for all the sub-
central governments (the so-called “Autonomous Communities”; AC’s from now on). 
That is, some AC’s have assumed the maximum level of responsibilities earlier than the 
others, although nowadays all of them have (more or less) the same level of 
responsibilities. Of the two investment categories analyzed, Roads were decentralized to 
all the AC’s during the first half of the eighties, Primary and Secondary Education was 
decentralized only to the first group of AC’s also during this period and to the rest of 
AC’s at the end of the nineties, and Tertiary Education was decentralized during the 
                                                          
1 A weakness of the literature on decentralization and growth is that, despite identifying a link between 
these two variables, it is obscure on its possible causes. The theoretical papers on this topic (see Zou, 
1996; Davodi and Zou, 1998; or Zhang and Zou, 2001) obtain that the optimal degree of decentralization 
is determined by the relative productivity of the expenditure made by the different levels of government. 
However, these papers do not make explicit which are the supposed advantages of decentralized 
governments in promoting economic growth. 
 
2 In a similar vein, by means of a simulation model, Rioja (2005) shows for Latin America that re-
allocating expenditures from public capital (“roads”) to education can raise growth up to a threshold. 
 
3 In 1980, the central government was responsible for the 90% of total public expenditure and local 
governments for the rest. In 2002, once the main expenditure responsibilities (Health and Education) were 
transferred to all the regional governments (those expenditure responsibilities account for more than half 
of total public expenditures assigned to this layer of government), these are responsible for around a 33%, 
the central government for a 55%, and local governments for the rest. See Pérez (2002). 
 
 5 
eighties for the first group and during the nineties for the second group. Figure 1 shows 
the evolution of the sub-central investment share in Roads and Education for the period 
analyzed (1977-98), specifying also the period of decentralization. Secondly, the 
Spanish case provides us with a unique database on public investment (total investment 
and investment made by the different layers of government) and capital stocks for the 
Spanish regions during this period (Fundación BBVA, 1998). This database includes 
road and education investment series during a long period comprising both 
centralization and decentralization years, and allows to identify the year of effective 
decentralization by looking at the first year were AC’s investment in a given category is 
non-zero.  
 
Figure 1. 
Share of sub-central investment in total investment:  
Investment in roads and education in 1977-1998 
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Notes: (1) Variables plotted are investment made by the 
Autonomous Communities (AC’s) over investment made by AC’s 
plus the central government; investment made by local 
governments is not considered here. (2) Investment education 
includes investment in primary, secondary and tertiary education. 
(3) Arrows signal periods of decentralization of responsibilities to 
sub-central governments (AC’s). (4) Source: Fundación BBVA 
(1998) and own elaboration. 
 
From the results obtained, the hypothesis of the “Decentralization Theorem” concerning 
Roads 
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the greater responsiveness of sub-central governments to local needs is clearly 
confirmed. Investment made by sub-central governments in both categories is much 
more sensitive to variations in output, users and environmental costs than central 
government, which suggests that the latter tends to underestimate expenditure needs in 
both investment categories. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop a simple 
model that serves to establish and justify the equations to be estimated in the empirical 
section. In section 3, we describe some methodological aspects of the empirical 
implementation, the sample, variables and data sources, and the econometric issues. In 
section 4, we present the main results of the empirical analysis, and section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Empirical framework 
 
In this section, we develop a simple model that will allow us to posit a log-linear 
equation explaining the allocation of investment across categories (i.e., roads and 
education) and across regions. This framework should allow us to consider how 
decentralization will affect that allocation process, and thus to develop a test of the 
hypothesis that decentralization modifies the assignment of government resources 
across regions and across investment categories. We organize the section in the 
following way. First, we develop the model under the assumption that the main 
purposes of the government when allocating resources across regions and categories are 
to achieve efficiency (i.e., maximize output) and/or to satisfy political constituencies. 
This model aims to capture the investment allocation process across categories and 
regions made by a typical sub-central government. Therefore, the term region should 
not be identified here with a sub-central government, but with a smaller geographical 
area4. Second, we consider the effects of decentralization over this allocation process by 
comparing the behavior of this sub-central government with one hypothetical central 
government that cares about the same set of regions and that experiences some 
difficulties in ascertaining the technology of producing road services and human capital. 
 
 
                                                          
4 This formulation is justified by the kind of data available, which allows us to investigate the allocation 
of investment across sub-regions inside each regional government. See section 3.2 for details.  
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2.1 Efficient allocation of public investment 
 
The equation explaining the allocation of investment in road and educational 
infrastructure across regions is obtained from the development of a stylized model 
combining two different blocks: (i) a production function relating the infrastructure 
capital stock to regional output, and (ii) a social choice rule that states that government 
cares both about maximizing total output and about satisfying political constituencies.  
 
(i) The production function 
 
For each region i and year t, output depends on Ait, which is a positive and neutral factor 
efficiency parameter, on inputs such as labor Lit and private capital Kit, and on the 
services provided by road infrastructures, itZ , and by human capital itH . Hence, the 
regional production function takes the form: 
 
                                              ),,,(. itititititit HZKLFAY =                                              (1) 
 
Both itZ  and itH  depend on the provision of public inputs, that is, the services 
provided by roads depend on the road capital stock, itR , while those provided by human 
capital depend on the stock of educational infrastructures, itE . Most papers analyzing 
the effects of infrastructures on economic growth implicitly assume that services 
provided by public capital are non-rival, and so use itR  and itE  instead of itZ  and itH . 
We posit instead a more general function of the determinants of itZ  and itH  that allows 
for the possibility that these infrastructures are congested to some extent, and so the 
services they provide depend on their size but also on their level of utilization and on 
other environmental cost factors (Bradford et al., 1969). Assuming for the moment a 
flexible relationship, in the case of roads, we have: 
 
                                                     ),,( itititit rURZZ =                                                  (2a) 
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where itR = road stock, itU = road use, and itr = environmental cost factors, such that 
∂Z/∂R>0, ∂Z/∂U<0 and ∂Z/∂r<05. That is, road services (e.g., speed and safety) are 
higher the higher the road infrastructure stock (e.g., quality-adjusted km of roads built), 
but lower the higher the number of users of that stock and the higher the costs of 
building that infrastructure in a given region. Although the literature on the estimation 
of road congestion effects is not new (see, e.g., Inman, 1978), there are only a few 
papers considering the effects of road congestion on economic growth. Some of them 
are theoretical (Fisher and Turnovsky, 1998, and Glomm and Ravikumar, 2000) and 
identify road users by means of the level of private capital (i.e., )itit KU ≈ . The 
empirical papers that estimate the effects of road congestion on growth use more direct 
measures of utilization, such as the number of km-year driven by vehicles (Fernald, 
1999, and Boarnet, 2001). Fernald (1999) analyzed the effects of increased road use for 
the US aggregate with time series data, but was not able to find any significant effect of 
congestion on economic growth. Using a translog specification of expression (2a), 
Boarnet (2001) finds evidence of detrimental growth effects of road congestion in the 
Californian counties. Other papers have tried to quantify the effects of utilization (e.g., 
number of vehicles, number of km-year driven, etc.) and cost variables (e.g., land area, 
urbanization patterns, etc.) on the regional allocation of road investment in Spain 
(Bosch and Espasa, 1999; and Castells and Solé-Ollé, 2005). The results of these papers 
suggest that the Spanish government invests more in roads in regions with high levels of 
congestion and costs. 
 
In the case of educational infrastructures, the relationship between human capital and 
the infrastructure stock, users and costs can be expressed as: 
 
                                                    ),,( itititit eSEHH =                                                  (2b) 
 
where itE = educational infrastructure stock,  itS = users of that stock, and ite = 
                                                          
5The most common functional form used to account for congestion is one that assumes a constant 
elasticity. In the case of roads, this function can be expressed as: Zit=Rit/(Uitαriβ), where α=1 in the case of 
a private good, and α=0 in the case of a pure public good. Fernald (1999) has used it, but it has been 
criticized on the grounds of exhibiting decreasing marginal congestion, while theory (Edwards, 1990) and 
empirical analysis (Inman, 1978) suggest that congestion should be growing in the margin. 
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environmental factors that raise the cost of education,  such that ∂H/∂E>0, ∂H/∂S<0 and 
∂H/∂e<0. That is, the services provided by human capital (e.g., average level of 
knowledge of the labor force) are higher the higher the educational infrastructure stock 
(e.g., quality-adjusted schools and university facilities built), but lower the higher the 
number of students using these facilities, and lower the higher the previous human 
capital stock, that proxies the level of investment on human capital made by the 
families. Other environmental cost variables, such as the land area of the region, 
urbanization patterns, or building costs, may also have some impact on the services that 
can be obtained from a given stock of educational infrastructure. This specification is 
similar to the one used in the literature on the estimation of education production 
functions (see, e.g., Das et al., 2004). Early evidence suggested that family inputs have 
a clearer impact on educational outcomes than public inputs (Hanushek, 1986 and 2003, 
for surveys), but recent analyses suggest that public resources have influence as well 
(Card and Krueger, 1992; Gymah-Brempagn and Gyapong, 1991 and 1992; Krueger, 
2003; Das et al., 2004). These results also hold at the macro-regional level in Spain; De 
la Fuente et al. (2003) find that both spending per student and the average years of study 
of the population have a positive impact on educational outcomes of Spanish regions6.  
The effect of both types of infrastructures on output can be expressed as:  
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Three elements appear in both expressions: (i) the elasticity of output to the services 
provided by the infrastructures ( YZitε  and 
YH
itε ), (ii) the elasticity of infrastructure 
services to changes in the infrastructure stock ( ZRitε  and 
HE
itε ), and (iii) the ratio of Yit to 
Rit and to Eit. As most of the analysis on the growth effects of infrastructures (see, e.g., 
Aschauer, 1989; Holtz-Eakin, 1994), we assume the elasticity of output to infrastructure 
services is constant: 
                                                          
6 Another strand of literature uses cost functions to estimate the effect of these variables, using data on US 
school districts (Chambers, 1980; Downes and Pogue, 1994; Duncombe and Yinger, 2003).  
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                                   YZYZ εεit =           and              YHYH εεit =                                        (4) 
 
We also assume that the elasticity of infrastructure services to the stock depends on the 
number of users and on environmental cost factors included in expressions (2a) and 
(2b): 
 
               ( ) ηitγititit rRUεε ZRZR ./=         and           ( ) μitκititHEHEit eESεε ./=                    (5) 
 
where εZR and εHE are the average value of these elasticities for the country, and γ, η, κ  
and μ  are non-zero parameters. We expect γ and κ to be positive. For example, in the 
case of roads, it means that the impact of an improvement in the road stock on speed 
depends on the number of users. In fact, some empirical work suggests that the increase 
in speed when the infrastructure is improved is higher the more this stock is used 
(Inman, 1978). Boarnet (2001) inserts a translog specification for expression (2a) into a 
production function, and also finds evidence that the impact of a road improvement is 
higher the higher the level of road use. In the case of educational infrastructures, it 
means that the impact of an increase in the infrastructure stock on educational 
performance is higher the higher the level of enrollment. The empirical research on 
education production and cost functions suggests that there are substantial economies of 
scale and density in the provision of education (see, e.g., Downes and Pogue, 1994, and 
Duncombe and Yinger, 2003). However, although it may seem intuitive, there are no 
results in the literature confirming or rejecting that the effect of an improvement on 
educational results is higher the more crowded are the facilities. 
 
A similar interpretation can be made in the case of the environmental cost variables. 
Take the case of education. The main environmental cost variable considered here is the 
average number of years of schooling of the population, which will measure the level of 
family educational inputs. We expect this variable to have a positive impact on 
educational attainment, and so to reduce the costs of achieving a given level of 
education. Regarding its role in (5), we can expect that the impact of investment in 
educational infrastructures on human capital will be higher the higher (the lower) the 
average level of schooling in the population if family and public inputs are 
 11 
complementary (substitutive). Since some empirical research on educational production 
functions suggests that public inputs and family inputs are substitutes (see, e.g., Das et 
al., 2004), we expect that the parameter μ will be negative in this case. Unfortunately, 
the literature does not provide a general guide with respect to the sign of η and μ for 
other cost variables, and one has to proceed separately for each variable. However, as 
will become clear below, we are not interested in the sign of these variables, but only in 
the change in the value of the coefficients as a result of decentralization.  
 
Substituting (4) and (5) into (3a) and (3b) we have: 
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(ii) The social choice rule 
 
We assume that road and educational investment is allocated among regions “as if” a 
government’s social welfare function –defined over the distribution of output among all 
regions– were maximized subject to a budget constraint. For the moment, we assume 
that this function represents the preferences of a sub-central government. In the next 
section, we will deal with the impact of decentralization by assuming that a similar 
function can be defined for the central government, with the arguments being exactly 
the same set of regions. 
 
This social welfare function can be analytically expressed as: 
 
                                                         ∑=
i
ititt YW .Ψ                                                         (7) 
 
where Yit is output of region i in year t and the parameters Ψit  are the political weights 
assigned to each region, and add to one for a given year. If  Ψit=Ψt, then the government 
simply aims at maximizing total output (i.e., Yt) and the allocation of public investment 
will be optimal, conditional on the knowledge of the parameters of the production 
function (1) and on the level of resources available for investment. If Ψit ≠ Ψt, the 
 12 
distribution of public investment will deviate from output maximization, and so will not 
be efficient. 
 
Simplicity is the main advantage of this approach, since allows obtaining a solution 
easy to implement at the empirical level. As we will show, following this approach, we 
will obtain an equation explaining the determinants of government’s investment in 
different regions that is additive in output and political factors, which permits 
decomposing investment variance in a share due to the efficiency concern and a share 
due to politics. One drawback of this approach might be that it does not provide a 
structural model of government behavior. However, recent work in the political 
economy field ends up with similar specifications, where output and political factors are 
additively combined (see, e.g., Dixit and Londregan, 1998).  
 
(iii) Optimal infrastructure stock 
 
The problem of the government consists of choosing a regional distribution of roads and 
educational investment to maximize expression (7), taking into account the effect of 
both types of infrastructure on output (6), and an exogenous budget constraint:  
 
                                                     ∑ ≤+
i
t
e
it
r
it III )(                                                        (8) 
 
where ritI  and 
e
itI  are road and educational investment in region i and year t, and tI  is 
the amount of resources available to invest in a given year t. We take tI  as given and 
constant across regions. This assumption is consistent with investment budgeting 
practices in Spain, since the overall level of investment for a given year is determined 
before its distribution by categories and regions7. The assumptions are also consistent 
with our empirical purpose, since we will analyze the empirical factors that drive the 
regional distribution of investment, having controlled for the annual investment effort.  
                                                          
7 In Spain, this amount used to be determined each year during the budgetary process depending on the 
availability of resources and the need for fiscal consolidation. A budgetary committee then ranks all 
planned investment projects, and the amount of resources available for investment determines the number 
of these projects to be undertook next year. 
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Differentiating (7) subject to (8) and (6) with respect to road and education investment 
in a given region and year, we obtain the following first order conditions: 
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where λt  is the marginal cost of public revenues, which we permit to vary from year to 
year. The different terms of expression (9) can be obtained by differentiation of (7) and 
from (6), taking into account (8) and ritit IR ∂∂ / = eitit IE ∂∂ / =1. Substituting these 
expressions into (9) and rearranging, we obtain the following alternative formulation: 
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The left-hand side is the marginal benefit of infrastructure, while the right-hand side is 
the marginal cost of investment. The former is higher the higher the elasticity of output 
to infrastructure services, and the higher the level of utilization and other environmental 
cost factors. The marginal cost does not only depend on the marginal cost of public 
funds (λt), but is lower in those regions with more political cloud (higher ψit). 
Combining both expressions, we obtain the ratio between the desired capital stocks for 
both types of infrastructures: 
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This expression implies that the government should divide overall investment resources 
between both inputs with the objective of equalizing marginal benefits. Taking logs in 
(10) and rearranging, we are able to obtain the following expression for the desired 
stock of infrastructures for each region ( *log itR  and 
*log itE ):  
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where )1/()loglog(log γλεε +−+= tZRYZtB  and )1/()loglog(log κλεε +−+= tt HEYHD . 
Therefore, the road and education capital stocks that the government plans for a region 
depend on various factors: (i) the average productivity of each type of infrastructure 
across all regions ( YZεlog  and YHεlog ), the average effect of capital stocks on road and 
education services ( ZRεlog  and HEεlog ), and the resources available to invest in a given 
year ( )log tλ , (ii) the differential productivity of these infrastructures in that region, 
which is influenced by the regional output ( itYlog ), the amount of users ( itUlog  and 
itSlog ) and the environmental cost variables ( itrlog  and itelog ), and (iii) the political 
cloud of the region ( itΨlog ).  
 
2.2 The effects of decentralization 
 
Following the previous insights, we now consider the key hypothesis that regional 
governments have better access to information about the technologies for producing 
road services and human capital. Accordingly, we will assume that while regional 
governments correctly apprehend the effect of itR , itU  and itr  on itZ  (and similarly of 
itE , itS  and ite  on itH ), the central government experiences some problems in 
ascertaining the impact of these variables on infrastructures services. To allow for this 
assumption, we amend expression (5) in the following way: 
 
          ( ) ttZRZR φηitφγititit rRUεε .. ./.=        and         ( ) tt itititHEit eESHE θμθκεε .. ./=                (13) 
 
where σdecrφ tt ).1(1 −+=  and τdeceθ tt ).1(1 −+= , and tdecr  and tdece  are dummies 
equal to one in the case of decentralized provision of roads and education, respectively, 
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and zero otherwise8. In the case of decentralization, 1=tφ  and 1=tθ , and expression 
(13) reduces to (5). In the case of centralization, the exponents tφ  and tθ  are lower 
(higher) than one when the parameters σ  and τ  are negative (positive), and so the 
perceived impact of the different variables on infrastructure services are underestimated 
(overestimated).  
 
Maximizing again (7) subject to (8), but now taking into account (13) and rearranging, 
we obtain the expressions for the desired stocks of roads and educational 
infrastructures: 
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with 
 
).1/()loglog(log' γφλεε ttZRYZtB +−+=  and )loglog(log
'
t
HEYH
t
D λεε −+= ).1/( κθt+  
 
Under decentralization, being 1== tt θφ , these expressions are just (12a) and (12b). 
Under centralization, when 1≠itφ  and 1≠itθ , the coefficients of the different variables 
in (14a) and (14b) may be either higher or lower than those under decentralization in 
(12a) and (12b). If 10 ≤≤ itφ  and 10 ≤≤ itθ , the central government underestimates 
the effect of the different variables and, accordingly, the coefficients are lower than in 
the case of centralization. If 1>itφ  and 1>itθ , the central government overestimates 
the effect of the different variables and, accordingly, the coefficients are higher than in 
the case of centralization. Which of these two situations prevails in practice is an 
empirical matter. In any case, if 1≠itφ  and 1≠itθ , the ratio between the two capital 
stocks in (11) will be distorted and the central government will tend to allocate too 
                                                          
8 Note that decrt and decet do only change from year to year and not across regions. This is because, we 
want to analyze the allocation of investment across regions belonging to the same sub-central government 
and decentralization occurred the same year for all of them.  
 
 16 
much or too few money to roads with respect to educational infrastructures. Thus, the 
important issue to take into account is that, under decentralization, the coefficients of all 
the variables might be different than under centralization. 
 
Finally, in order to clarify the testing procedure, and recalling that σdecrφ tt ).1(1 −+=  
and τdeceθ tt ).1(1 −+= , it is useful to redefine expressions (14a) and (14b) as: 
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(15b)  
 
Hence, our hypothesis implies that the coefficients of the different variables interacted 
with the decentralization dummies should be different from zero, since the effect of 
these variables on the desired capital stocks differs across regimes (centralized and 
decentralized). 
 
3. Empirical implementation 
 
3.1 Some methodological aspects 
 
Some further issues must be taken into account to ensure (15a) and (15b) are 
implementable and the results of the estimation tell us something about the relative 
responsiveness of centralized and decentralized system to regional needs: (i) design of 
the test and sample selection, (ii) inclusion of regional, time and time×sub-central 
government effects, (iii) dynamics of investment decisions, and (iv) timing and 
identification of the political factors.  
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(i) Design of the test and sample selection 
 
The empirical exercise aims at testing the hypothesis that sub-central governments do a 
better job than the central government in forecasting regional road and education needs. 
We wish to isolate this effect from any other influence of decentralization on the 
allocation of investment across regions. An accurate selection of the data used to 
perform this test is fundamental. 
 
Recall that (15a) and (15b) represent the capital stock desired by the government in two 
categories (roads and education) and in the different sub-regions belonging to the 
jurisdiction of a sub-central government. This means that to test our hypothesis we 
should use data corresponding to different sub-regions belonging to the same regional 
government. For each of these sub-regions (of size smaller than that of the sub-central 
jurisdiction), we need a time series of data of road and educational infrastructure stocks, 
which should include enough number of years of both regimes (centralized and 
decentralized), in order to test if the coefficients of the different variables differ across 
regimes. Fortunately, we have had access to data for Spain that complies with all these 
prerequisites. We will provide details about it in section 3.2. For the moment, just 
mention that we have data on road and educational investment and capital stocks for the 
period 1976-98 for all the NUTS-3 regions in Spain (so-called ‘provincias’). This period 
fits well our purposes, since there are episodes of decentralization of road and education 
responsibilities distributed across the period, the concrete year depending on the 
category and on the sub-central government involved (see Figure 1). Using investment 
data by level of government (central and sub-central) for each NUTS-3 during this 
period, we are able to detect the precise year when road or education responsibilities 
were decentralized to each of the sub-central governments, and so to define the 
dummies tdecr  and tdece .  
 
Since we are interested in explaining the allocation of road and educational investment 
across the NUTS-3 regions of a given sub-central government (AC’s, corresponding to 
Eurostat’s NUTS-2 regions), we will use the observations of all the NUTS-3 regions 
belonging to sub-central governments with more than one NUTS-3 region9. The 
                                                          
9 Out of 17 sub-central governments in Spain, 6 have one NUTS-3 region, and 11 have more than one.  
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inclusion in the sample of the sub-central governments with only one NUTS-3 region is 
unnecessary, since we will include in the equation time effects specific to all the regions 
belonging to the same sub-central government. This procedure is coherent with (15a) 
and (15b), where the overall amount of resources devoted to the jurisdiction of a sub-
central government (accounted by tλlog ) is fixed. Moreover, proceeding in this way is 
better than estimating the equation using data aggregated to the NUTS-2 level for 
various reasons. Firstly, there would be a loss of observations, from 44 to 17 each year. 
Secondly, we would be analyzing only the decision of the government (either central or 
sub-central) as to how much to invest in roads vs. education, but we would loss 
information about the decisions regarding how to allocate investment in roads and in 
education across sub-regions within the sub-central jurisdiction. Thirdly, Spanish sub-
central governments had a very small degree of tax autonomy during that period; so the 
amount of investment in roads and education was conditioned under decentralization by 
the overall amount of grant resources received. One of the effects of decentralization 
could have precisely been to shift the overall amount of resources allocated to the 
jurisdictions of the different sub-central governments. If this were the case, it would be 
very difficult to identify changes in the allocation of resources between categories (i.e., 
roads and education). What can be expected in this case is that rich sub-central 
governments (those that receive more monies after decentralization) will increase their 
investment in roads, education, and in any other service responsibility they had. In order 
to purge the effects of overall resource changes due to decentralization, it seems better 
to analyze the distribution of sub-central investment across these categories and across 
the different NUTS-3 regions belonging to its jurisdiction.  
 
(ii) Individual and time effects 
 
Some measurement problems recommend including time and regional effects in the 
investment equations (15a) and (15b). First, it is difficult to quantify the terms 'tB  and 
'
tD , which include invariant factors across regions but that change over time as, for 
example, the amount of resources available to invest in the jurisdiction of the sub-
central government (i.e., tλlog ) or an indicator of the decentralization status (i.e., tφ ). 
Although it is possible to include variables measuring the resources available to sub-
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central governments during the decentralization years, there is no way to quantify the 
amount of budgetary resources allocated to each sub-central jurisdiction during the 
centralization years. One way to control for this is to include a set of time effects 
specific to each sub-central government (i.e., jtf , where t indicates year and j indicates 
sub-central government).  
 
Second, some of the environmental cost variables that are candidates to be included in 
itr  and ite are very difficult to measure and/or do not change over time (e.g., land area, 
topography, weather). These effects can be controlled through the inclusion of regional 
effects (fi). Notice that environmental cost factors are interacted with decrt or decet. This 
means that the impact of cost variables should be allowed to change before and after 
decentralization takes place. We take into account this possibility by including two 
different sets of regional effects: rif  and decrt × rdif , , in the roads equation, and eif  
and  decet × edif , , in the education equation. 
 
(iii) Dynamics  
 
To develop an estimable model based on (15a) and (15b), we assume that adjusting the 
road and educational capital stocks to their desired long-run level entails significant 
costs. We assume that the increase in the infrastructure stock will be a portion ( rρ and 
eρ , for roads and education, respectively) of the difference between the desired stock 
( ∗itRlog  and ∗itElog ) and the perceived stock of the previous year ( 1log. −itt Rφ and 
1log. −itt Eθ ):  
 
    )log(loglogΔ 1
* −−= ittitrit RφRρR    and   )log(loglogΔ 1* −−= ittiteit EθEρE       (16) 
 
That is, we are considering that the central government also has more difficulties in 
appraising the actual level of road and educational infrastructures in the regions than 
sub-central governments. This assumption is consistent with the treatment given to the 
different user and environmental cost variables included in equation (13). 
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After some operations on the permanent inventory equation, we are able to write10:   
 
       rit
r
itit δRIR −≅ − )/(logΔ 1            and         eiteitit δEIE −≅ − )/(logΔ 1                (17) 
 
Where ritI  and
e
itI  are gross investment in roads and educational infrastructures, and 
rδ and eδ are the depreciation rates of these capital stocks. Using again 
σφ ).1(1 tt decr−+=  and τθ ).1(1 tt dece−+= , including regional and time effects in 
(15a) and (15b), and substituting these expressions and (17) in (16), after some algebra, 
we obtain the investment equations: 
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(18b) 
 
where er,δ are picked up by the respective fixed effects. Estimation of dynamic panel 
equations like these poses some econometric problems. We will explain in detail the 
econometric procedure latter; for the moment, it suffices to note that the obtaining of the 
equations finally estimated will require transforming the model in first differences11:  
 
                                                          
10Rearranging the inventory equation and taking logs, we get )/1log(log 1
r
it
r
itit RIR δ−+=Δ − ; the 
left hand side can be approximated by rit
r
it δRI −−1/  when this expression approaches zero. 
 
11 Given that there are two sets of regional effects (one for each regime), the first-differences 
transformation must be done separately for each regime. Thus, we loose two cross-sections after 
differentiation instead of one. 
 21 
 
'ΨΨ
211
ΨlogΔ)....(
logΔ)....(logΔ)....(
logΔ)....()/).(..1(/
jtitt
rr
itt
rrrr
itt
UrUr
itt
YrYr
it
r
itt
Rrr
it
r
it
fdecrβραρ                  
rdecrβραρUdecrβραρ                  
Ydecrβραρ RIdecrβρρRI
+++
++++
++−−= −−−
   (19a) 
 
jtitt
ee
itt
eeee
itt
SeSe
itt
YeYe
it
e
itt
Eee
it
e
it
fdeceξρερ                  
edeceξρερSdeceξρερ                  
YdeceξρερEIdecrβρρEI
'ΨlogΔ)....(
logΔ)....(logΔ)....(
logΔ)....()/).(..1(/
ΨΨ
211
+++
++++
++−−= −−−
     (19b) 
 
(iv) Political factors 
 
Expressions (19a) and (19b) imply that –once one has been able to control for fixed 
regional effects – increased political cloud ( itΨlogΔ ) instead of its level ( itΨlog ) is 
what is deemed to influence investment in roads and education infrastructures. Thus, as 
in the case of the other variables, the equations suggest that we should rely only on 
time-series variation in order to identify the effect of political variables. However, the 
variable we use to make itΨlog  operative (i.e., the vote share of the incumbent; see 
section 3.2) is measured only when an election is held (at time t=k), and is constant until 
the next election (at time t=k+4). This means that, once first differences are taken, the 
political variables are zero all the non-election years and different from zero the year 
after an election. Therefore, the source of variation of these variables may not suffice to 
identify their effects on the allocation of investment. 
 
However, some authors have documented differential electoral cycle effects of political 
traits (see, e.g., Besley and Case, 1995, and Millimet et al., 2004, for the case of U.S. 
gubernatorial term limits). We take this into account and, following Castells and Solé-
Ollé (2005), combine election-dependent political data with different effects along the 
cycle to obtain:  
 
                                 [ ] kit dβdβdβdβ Ψlog.....Ψlog 33221100 +++=                                       (20) 
 
Where d0 is a dummy variable equal to one if we are in an election year, and d1, d2 and 
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d3 are dummies equal to one if we are one year, two years and three years before a new 
election, respectively. The β parameters measure the effect of political variables at those 
dates; the effects are expected to be (at least) non-decreasing as the new election 
approaches (i.e., 23 ββ ≤ 01 ββ ≤≤ ). Taking first-differences in (20) and rearranging we 
obtain:  
 
                [ ] k
kkit
dββdββdββ                
dββdβ
Ψlog.).().().(
Ψlog.).(ΨlogΔ..ΨlogΔ
232121010
130333
−+−+−
+−+= −                        (21) 
 
This expression states that we should include in the investment equation: i) the variable 
in first-differences interacted with the first-year-of-term dummy (i.e., d3), ii) the 
variable in levels corresponding to the previous term of office also interacted with d3, 
and iii) the variables in levels of the present electoral term of office interacted with the 
dummies of each of the remaining years until the next election (i.e., d2, d1 and d0). The 
first and third effects are deemed to be non-negative (if β3≥0 and 0123 ββββ ≤≤≤ ) 
and the second one is negative (since β3≤β0). In practice, the pattern of influence of a 
political variable along the electoral cycle may be simpler. There are two main 
possibilities that should be tested empirically. The first one is to assume that the effects 
of a political variable are the same irrespective of the position in the cycle (i.e., H0: 
βββββ ==== 3210 ). In this case (21) simplifies to: 
 
                                                     3.ΨlogΔ.ΨlogΔ dβ kit =                                                           (22a) 
 
If this is the case, only the change in a political trait after an election should be included 
in the equation. The second one is to assume that the additional effect of a variable is 
the same irrespective of the position in the cycle (i.e., 
H0: βββββββ Δ=−=−=− )()()( 322110 ): 
 
            [ ] 3133210 .Ψlog.Δ3.ΨlogΔ..Ψlog.ΔΨlogΔ dβdβdddβ kkkit −++++=            (22b) 
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In this case, the three variables should be included, but the coefficient of the actual term 
of office variables remains constant. Our empirical strategy will be to estimate the 
investment equations (19a) and (19b) with the three variables ( kk ΨlogΔ,Ψlog  and 
1Ψlog −k ) and then test these two hypotheses. These three variables are computed each 
year with data corresponding to central or sub-central elections, depending on which of 
these two contests is the relevant one for the regime we are analyzing. Accordingly, the 
dummies used in (22b) indicate either the position along the central or the sub-central 
electoral cycle. 
 
3.2 Sample, variables and data sources 
 
(i) Sample and investment data 
 
As we previously explained, (19a) and (19b) will be estimated with data on road and 
education investment made by the public sector (i.e., central + subcentral) in each of the 
44 Spanish regions (NUTS-3) belonging to the subcentral governments with more than 
one NUTS-3 region, during the period 1977-98. The source of regional data is 
Fundación BBVA (1998), “The capital stock in Spain and its territorial distribution”. 
This database – which has been previously used in many empirical analysis estimating 
production functions and which accuracy is widely accepted12 – provides information on 
public investment and capital stocks – computed from investment series using the 
annual inventory method – of the main public spending categories (i.e., roads, railroads, 
ports, airports, urban infrastructures, water transportation and treatment, education and 
health), from 1965 to 1998. 
 
The reasons why we choose NUTS-3 regions instead of NUTS-2 ones were explained in 
the section 3.1. The period analyzed was chosen because it is necessary to include 
observations of the two different regimes (centralized and decentralized) in order to be 
able to estimate the value of the parameters in both cases. Note that although the series 
in our database date back to 1965, we choose to begin in 1977. The reason of the 
decision is that in this year the first democratic elections in Spain took place. It would 
                                                          
12 See e.g,., Mas et al. (1996), and De la Fuente and Vives (1995) for analysis using this data set; and Mas 
et al.(2000) for a description of the method of calculation of capital stocks. 
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not have been possible to use our political cloud variables before that data, as they are 
computed using electoral data.  
 
To identify these two situations we compute the desrit, despit and destit dummies, for 
roads, primary and secondary education, and tertiary education, respectively. These 
dummies take the value of zero under centralization and one under decentralization, and 
have been computed using either time series of the investment made by the two levels 
of government in these categories or data on the year of the legal transfer of 
responsibilities. Investment data by level of government also comes from the Fundación 
BBVA (1998). In the case of roads and primary and secondary education, 
decentralization can be detected by the switch form zero investment to positive 
investment by a sub-central government in a given year. This is not the case for tertiary 
education, because this responsibility was decentralized latter on, when the sub-central 
governments were already spending on other types of education. In this case we use 
information of the data of the legal transfer of the responsibility. 
 
The road and education investment series are provided at a high level of aggregation, 
which poses some problems to our procedure. Firstly, the road series is the aggregate of 
investment both in intra-regional and in inter-regional roads, but only the first type of 
roads was decentralized. This means that road investment in the decentralized regime 
does not include only investment made by sub-central governments but also investment 
made by the central government in inter-regional roads. Given that the central 
government does not behave differently before and after decentralizing intra-regional 
roads, the change in the response of overall investment to regional needs with 
decentralization should reflect only the different responsiveness of central and sub-
central governments to intra-regional road needs. Secondly, the education series is the 
aggregate of primary, secondary and tertiary education; all these types of education 
have been decentralized, but the timing depends on the category and year. Hence, there 
is not one change of regime but two: the decentralization of primary and secondary 
education, and the decentralization of tertiary education. There are two ways of 
proceeding in this case. The first one is estimating different parameters for each of the 
three regimes (centralization, decentralization of primary and secondary education, and 
decentralization of the three categories). The second one consists of using only two 
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regimes, but computing the decentralization dummy as: deseit =ωi × despit + (1- ωi) × 
destit, where ωi is the average weight of primary and secondary education investment on 
total education investment in the sub-central government i. Since the analysis suggests 
that there are no significant changes in the three-regime case, we will present only the 
two-regime results. 
 
(ii) Economic variables 
 
Explanatory variables are classified into two groups: economic variables and political 
variables. Table 1 summarizes their definitions and data sources. The first economic 
variable included both in the road and education equation is regional output (ΔlogYit), 
measured as real regional GDP at market prices. The second group of economic 
variables included measures the number of users of the infrastructures (i.e., ΔlogUit and 
ΔlogSit, for roads and education, respectively). In the case of roads, users are measured 
by means of the number of industrial vehicles (e.g., trucks and vans, ΔlogVehit), and by 
the number of km-year driven by vehicles (ΔlogKmit). The second one seems to be a 
better measure, being the first one only a crude proxy of the level of traffic. This 
suggests that these two variables should not enter simultaneously in the equation, but in 
alternative specifications. There is, however, one independent rationale for the inclusion 
of the number of vehicles in the equation. As Fernald (1999) shows, the marginal 
productivity of road services may be higher in regions with industries intensive in the 
use of transportation services. The results in Castells and Solé (2005) and Castells et al. 
(2005) suggest that in fact this intensity is correlated with the number of industrial 
vehicles. Thus, we will provide results using simultaneously both variables. The 
measure of users included in the case of education is simply the schooling age 
population, measured as the population of age 6 to 25 (ΔlogYoungit)13. 
 
                                                          
13 One may argue that the schooling age population may be a crude proxy of the actual number of users, 
at least in the cases of upper-secondary and tertiary education since participation is not compulsory, and 
that it may be better to use directly the number of students. The problem here rests on the difficulty of 
getting consistent information on the number of students by region for all the full period of analysis. 
However, in order to control for this fact we have included in the equations some of the possible 
determinants of the participation rate: unemployment, average years of study of the population, and GDP. 
The last two variables were already included in the original specification. As for the unemployment rate, 
its coefficient was barely significant and the results were qualitatively unaltered, so we decided, at the 
end, not to present the results including this variable. 
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Table 1. Variable definitions and data sources 
 Mean (s.d.) Definition Sources 
1/ −itrit RI  
0.121 
(0.113) 
Road investment by all the levels of 
government divided by the previous year’s 
capital stock  
1/ −iteit EI  
0.116 
(0.132) 
Education investment by all the levels of 
government divided by the previous year’s 
capital stock  
Fundación BBVA (1998), 
& Population Statistics, 
Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística (INE) 
itdecr  
0.706 Dummy equal to one if the regional 
government has the responsibility of 
providing regional roads 
itdece  
0.366 Weighted sum of a dummy equal to one if 
the regional government has the 
responsibility of providing primary and 
secondary education, and a dummy equal 
to one if the regional government has the 
responsibility of providing higher 
education, with the weights being the 
average share of both education levels in 
total education investment 
 
 
 
 
 
Fundación BBVA (1998) 
and own elaboration 
itYlogΔ  
0.011 
(0.023) 
Growth rate of output  Regional Accounts & 
Population Statistics, 
Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística (INE) 
itVehlogΔ  
0.024 
(0.014) 
Growth rate of the number of vehicles Ministerio de Fomento 
itKmlogΔ  
0.096 
(0.075) 
Growth rate of km run by vehicles per year Ministerio de Fomento 
itYounglogΔ  
0.005 
(0.009) 
Growth rate of population 6 to 24 years old Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística (INE) 
itYearslogΔ  
0.007 
(0.006) 
Growth rate of average years of education Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística (INE) and own 
elaboration  
ikv log  
0.441 
(0.152) 
Incumbent’s share of votes in the last 
election, computed as a weighted share of 
the central and sub-central incumbent’s 
vote share 
Anuario El País,  
www.eleweb.es and  
Own elaboration 
  
Notes: (1) In the case of dummy variables only the mean is presented, and should be 
interpreted as the proportion of regions in this situation during the period analyzed. 
 
 
The third group of economic variables includes the environmental cost factors (i.e., 
Δlog rit and Δlog eit, for roads and education, respectively). In the case of roads, most of 
the relevant cost factors (e.g., land area, urbanization patterns, topography or weather) 
can be considered as time invariant. Thus, we do not include them in the equation, and 
consider that the regional fixed effects pick up the cost factors. Something similar 
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happens with cost factors in the case of education. However, in this case, we include a 
time-varying environmental cost variable: the average number of years of education of 
the population (ΔlogYearsit). As we explained in section two, this variable proxies 
educational inputs provided by the family, which are expected to have a positive 
influence on human capital and to be substitute of publicly provided education inputs14. 
This variable has been computed by multiplying the share of population aged 25 and 
over by education level (i.e., illiterates, primary, lower secondary, upper secondary, and 
higher education) by the duration of studies at each level (using the data provided in De 
la Fuente et al., 2003) and then summing up across categories.  
 
(iii) Political variables 
 
The term Ψit accounts for the political influence of each region in obtaining investment 
funds from the layer of government responsible of distributing them. A growing 
literature analyses the political factors leading the regional allocation of public funds 
(Levitt and Snyder, 1995, Johansson, 2003, Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002, Cadot et al., 
1999, and Case, 2001). In these papers, the main determinants of regional redistribution 
are, for example, the marginal electoral gains to be obtained in the region, the desire to 
benefit party constituencies, or the presence of active interest groups. Here we will only 
focus on the second factor, assuming that the government will allocate more resources 
to the districts were higher political support is obtained, aiming thus at providing 
benefits to the voters that remain loyal to the party. This is the case, for example, of the 
model developed by Cox and McCubins (1986). In this model, the parties’ purpose is to 
win the election, but because they are risk-averse they prefer to invest in the voter 
groups whose support is guaranteed15. We take this factor into account by including a 
                                                          
14 In order to measure family inputs, we also tried with other the variables: unemployment, non-EU 
immigrants, and illiterates, but the results did not improve very much. 
 
15 An alternative hypothesis is obtained when considering that the strategy of the government consists of 
investing in those regions where there are more swing voters (i.e., voters that are indifferent between the 
parties, see e.g., Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987, Dixit and Londregan, 1998, Snyder, 1989). Several papers 
have tested this hypothesis with mixed evidence (see, e.g., Wright, 1974, Case, 2001, Johansson, 2003, 
Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002, and Strömberg, 2004). It is not always easy to disentangle both 
hypotheses from the data; for example, the political support hypothesis is often tested including the vote 
share of the incumbent and the swing voter hypothesis including the difference between the vote share 
and 50%. Both hypotheses can be disentangled when swing voters are quantified directly with a measure 
of the density of voter at the cut-point, but this is not feasible in our case (as in Dahlberg and Johansson, 
2002). 
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variable that measures the absolute electoral support received by the incumbent party (in 
the central or in the regional government): the incumbent’s vote share in the last 
election (log vik). We expect this variable to have a positive influence on investment 
allocated to a region. Of course, alternative hypotheses could have been considered and 
other political variables included in the equation, but we consider that the present 
approach is satisfactory, given data constraints and the mere role of political variables as 
controls in our equation16.  
 
Finally, we have to deal with the fact that in many cases the decentralization regime 
does not mean that sub-central governments are the only agents investing in 
infrastructures, and so Ψit picks up the political cloud the region has both for the central 
and sub-central government. This never happens in the centralization regime: the only 
government investing is the central one. But in the case of roads, investment in the 
decentralization regime also includes investment made by the central government in 
inter-regional roads. In the case of education, some sub-central governments first got the 
responsibilities in primary and secondary education and some years later in tertiary 
education, but during all the period investment in education includes all these 
categories. The way to deal with this problem is computing the vote share variable as a 
weighted sum of those corresponding to each of the two government tiers, being 
weights the share of investment in a given category made by each tier during that year 
and in that region. That is, we have =ikvlog cikcit v ω log×  sikcit vω log)1( ×−+ , where c 
and s indicate central and sub-central, respectively, and citω  is the share of investment 
made in by the central government in a given category (e.g., roads or education). 
Obviously, when these political variables are allowed to have a different effect 
depending on the position in the electoral cycle, two different sets of dummies (for the 
central and sub-central electoral cycles) are used. That is, at the end, the exact value of 
the vote share variable in a given region and year depends on the vote shares of the 
                                                          
16See Castells and Solé-Ollé (2005) for the use of wider array of political variables to explain the regional 
allocation of transportation investment in Spain in the period 1987-94. Unfortunately the information 
needed to compute some of these variables is not available for a longer period. Some of the variables 
included can be easily computed for all the period (e.g., a dummy indicating if the parties in the central 
and sub-central governments have a similar ideology, and dummy indicating if the parties in the sub-
central government are pivotal in the central legislative). However, these variables have the same value 
for all the regions belonging to the jurisdiction of the same sub-central government and, therefore, cannot 
be used jointly with a set of sub-central government time effects. 
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parties in the central and sub-central governments in the past central and sub-central 
elections, weighted by the participation of each tier in the investment made that year, 
and on the exact position in both electoral cycles. 
 
3.3 Econometric issues 
 
Note that (19a) and (19b) include the lagged value of the dependent variable 
(i.e., 21 / −− itrit RI  and 21 / −− iteit RI , for roads and education, respectively). In addition to 
that, if the error term in the levels equation (εit) was uncorrelated, then the error term in 
the differenced equation will show negative first order autocorrelation (εit -εit-1). If this 
is the case, the lagged dependent variable will be correlated with the error term and OLS 
estimators will be biased if the number of years in the panel is small (Nickel, 1981, and 
Arellano and Bond, 1991). Although the time series of our database is quite large (from 
1977 to 1998), the real length of the series is shorter because we are estimating different 
coefficients for both regimes (centralized and decentralized). The solution to this 
problem consists of estimating these equations by the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM), using lagged values of variables in levels as instruments (Anderson and Hsiao, 
1981; Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen, 1988; Arellano and Bond, 1991)17. We will use 
as instruments six lags of the infrastructure stock (logRt-2 to logRt-7 or log Et-2 to log Et-
7). The number of instruments will be the same for all the years in the sample. This 
procedure does not suppose loosing any of the cross-sections, because we have 
information for the instruments in years preceding those used in the analysis18.  
 
In addition to this, note that the output growth variable included in equations (19a) and 
(19b) must be considered endogenous. In fact, the production function used to derive 
our equation (expression (1)) ultimately tells us that output depends on the road and 
educational capital stocks, and so output growth is enhanced by investment in these 
                                                          
17 In principle, in presence of heteroscedasticy, it is more efficient to use the two-step GMM procedure. 
However, simulations performed by Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest that standard errors for the two-
step estimators can be a poor guide for hypothesis testing in typical sample sizes; in these cases, inference 
based on standard errors for the one-step estimator seems to be more reliable (see Arellano and Bond, 
1991 and Blundell and Bond, 1998, for further discussion).  
 
18 The equations have been estimated with the GMM command of TSP 4.5.  
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infrastructures. To cope with this problem we also instrument output growth with six 
lags of its level (logYt-2 to logYt-7). 
 
The assumption of no serial correlation in εit is crucial to guarantee the consistency of 
the GMM estimator. For this reason, we will provide two tests of serial correlation. We 
expect to find first order serial correlation in the residuals but not second order serial 
correlation. We also include a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions to check for the 
validity of the set of instruments (Arellano y Bond, 1991). This test is distributed under 
the null of instrument validity as a χ2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
overidentifying restrictions.  
 
4. Results 
 
Tables 2 and 3 present the results obtained in the estimation of road and education 
investment equations, respectively. The explanatory capacity of the model is high in 
both cases, with an adjusted R2 around 70% in the road investment case and around 
50% in the case of education investment. The bottom of both tables shows the results of 
a battery of specification statistics. The serial correlation tests show that there is first 
order serial correlation in the residuals of the differenced model, but not second order 
correlation. This fact gives us some confidence about the appropriateness of the 
instrument set, which is confirmed by the Sargan test. In all the cases, the time effects 
are significant, and also the time × sub-central government effects, so regional 
investment in road and in education are influenced by some factors that vary yearly but 
that are common to all the regions belonging to the same sub-central government (e.g., 
the overall amount of resources). Both the regional effects and the region × 
decentralization effects are significant, which means that some omitted time invariant 
factors influence investment (e.g., cost factors), and in a stronger way after 
decentralization.  
 
We begin with the discussion of the road investment equation. The first three columns 
of Table 2 show the results when we impose the constraint that the coefficients should 
be the same across regimes. The first column shows the OLS results and the second and 
third columns show the GMM results, the second including only the economic variables 
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and the third one including also the political cloud variables. Regarding the results 
obtained, we must highlight the following conclusions. Firstly, economic determinants 
seem to have more explanatory capacity than political variables. The R2 increases only a 
little bit when political factors are added to the equation (i.e., from 0.714 to 0.746). 
Secondly, the results show that investment adjusts slowly towards its long-run value. 
The value of the adjustment coefficient ρr is 0.4. Thirdly, the results also show that 
infrastructure investment is sensitive to output growth ( itYlogΔ ) and the coefficient is 
statistically significant at conventional levels, with a value of 0.31, implying a long-run 
value around 0.77 (see Table 4 for the estimated values of structural parameters). That 
is, a 1 per cent increase in output leads to a 0.77 increase in the road stock that the 
government plans to build in a region.  
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Table 2:  Effects of decentralization on road investment ( 1/ −itrit RI ).  
Sample of 44 regions during 1977-1998 (44 × 22 – 44 × 2  = 880 obs.)(1).  
 (1) OLS (2) GMM (4) GMM (5) OLS (6) GMM (7) GMM
 i) Lagged investment  
1/ −itrit RI  
0.676(2) 
(27.234)***
0.585 
(16.169)***
0.600 
(15.104) ***
0.650 
(7.300)*** 
0.655 
(4.201)** 
0.672 
(5.241) ***
)/( 1−× itritit RIdecr  --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.029 (1.542)
-0.054 
(-1.320) 
-0.030 
(-0.841)
ii) Economic variables 
itYlogΔ  
0.344 
(7.765)***
0.329 
(3.349)***
0.311 
(2.511)**
0.168 
(2.459)**
0.156 
(2.393)** 
0.160 
(2.413)**
itit Ydecr logΔ×  --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.062 (4.056)*** 
0.143 
(3.334)*** 
0.120 
(3.100) ***
itVehlogΔ  
0.052 
(1.753)*
0.072 
(2.373)**
0.069 
(2.103) **
0.024 
(1.855)*
0.025 
(1.347) 
0.019 
(1.520)
itit Vehdecr logΔ×  --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.121 (3.740)*** 
0.164 
(4.361)*** 
0.146 
(3.654) ***
itKmlogΔ  
0.013 
(1.442) 
0.017 
(2.100)**
0.020 
(2.341)**
0.004 
(1.537)
0.004 
(1.702)* 
0.004 
(1.805) *
itit Kmdecr logΔ×  --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.005 (1.991)**
0.010 
(2.574)** 
0.012 
(2.741)**
iii) Political cloud 
[ ]210log dddv ik ++× --.-- --.-- 0.002 (2.226)*** --.-- --.-- 0.001 (1.989)**
[ ]210log dddv decr ikit ++×× --.-- --.-- ---.-- --.-- --.-- 0.002 (1.541)
3logΔ dv ik ×  --.-- --.-- 0.001 (2.456)** --.-- --.-- 
0.001 
(2.312)**
3.logΔ dv decr ikit ×  --.-- --.-- ---.-- --.-- --.-- 0.000 (1.521)
31log dv ik ×−  --.-- --.-- -0.004 (-1.624) --.-- --.-- 
-0.003 
(-1.554)
31log dv decr ikit ×× −  --.-- --.-- ---.-- --.-- --.-- -0.001 (-0.312)
R2-adj. 0.727 0.714 0.746 0.732 0.725 0.744 
Wald-test:  ft (3) 163.06*** 158.64*** 163.77** 171.21*** 163.06*** 160.25*** 
Wald -test:  fjt (3) 218.52** 220.33** 230.11** 232.46** 218.52** 200.58** 
Wald -test:  fi (3) 150.10*** 146.59*** 140.21*** 151.58*** 150.10*** 163.20*** 
Wald -test:  dec it × f (3) 65.12** 71.54** 68.54** 72.45** 68.27** 65.47** 
Wald (d0=d1=d2) (4) --.-- --.-- 0.320 --.-- --.-- 0.295 
LM (1st order corr.) (5) --.-- -2.590*** -2.609*** --.-- -2.820*** -2.746*** 
LM (2nd order corr.) (5) --.-- -0.691 -0.300 --.-- -0.601 -0.322 
Sargan (instr. validity) (6) --.-- 0.007 [0.999]
0.008 
[0.999] --.-- 
0.008 
[0.999] 
0.009 
[0.999]
 Notes: (1) Sample includes the 44 NUTS-3 regions (“provincias”) belonging to 11 sub-central governments  
(NUTS-2 regions) with more than one NUTS-3 region; the period goes from 1977 to 1998 but since the data has 
been differenced in order to eliminate both the regional effects (fi) and the regional-decentralization effects (decit×fi), 
two years are lost. (2) t-statistics in brackets; ***, ** & * indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 
99, 95 and 90% levels, respectively. (3) Wald tests on the significance of time effects, time × sub-central 
government effects, region effects, and region×decentralization effects. (4) Wald test of the null hypothesis H0: (β0-
β1)=(β1-β2)=(β2-β3)=Δβ ; (5) LM tests on first and second order error correlation. (6) Sargan test statistic of 
instrument validity (distributed under the null of instrument validity as a χ2(q), with q=number of overidentifying 
restrictions) and p-value (in brackets); endogenous variables in the GMM estimation are lagged investment and 
output growth and instruments are logRit-2 to logRit-7, and logYit-2, to logYit-7.  
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Table 3:  Effects of decentralization on education investment ( 1/ −it
e
it EI ).  
Sample of 44 regions during 1977-1998 (44 × 22 – 44 × 2  = 880 obs.)(1).  
 (1) OLS (2) GMM (4) GMM (5) OLS (6) GMM (7) GMM
 i) Lagged investment  
1/ −iteit EI  
0.596(2) 
(23.526)***
0.677 
(10.876)***
0.634 
(8.774)***
0.655 
(20.341)*** 
0.645 
(10.210)*** 
0.630 
(8.942)***
)/( 1−× iteitit EIdece  --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.015 (1.324)
-0.023 
(1.120) 
-0.010 
(-0.841)
ii) Economic variables 
itYlogΔ  
0.185 
(2.893)***
0.221 
(3.294)***
0.200 
(3.541)***
0.166 
(3.550)*** 
0.168 
(2.710)*** 
0.160 
(2.351)**
itit Ydece logΔ×  --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.115 (7.514)*** 
0.122 
(7.724)*** 
0.136 
(6.987)***
itYounglogΔ  
0.277 
(6.972)***
0.276 
(6.662)***
0.255 
(6.510)***
0.165 
(4.231)*** 
0.247 
(3.551)*** 
0.255 
(3.746)***
itit Youngdece logΔ×  --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.125 (8.437)*** 
0.111 
(8.223)*** 
0.100 
(7.874)***
itYearslogΔ  
-0.110 
(-1.023)
-0.196 
(-2.162)**
-0.184 
(-2.103) **
-0.175 
(-0.693)
-0.170 
(-1.767)* 
-0.174 
(-1.521)
itit Yearsdece logΔ×  --.-- --.-- --.-- -0.021 (-0.652)
-0.099 
(-2.325)** 
-0.124 
(-1.845)*
iii) Political cloud 
[ ]210log dddv ik ++× --.-- --.-- 0.001 (1.654)* --.-- --.-- 0.000 (1.748)*
[ ]210log dddv dece ikit ++×× --.-- --.-- ---.-- --.-- --.-- -0.210 (-0.364)
3logΔ dv ik ×  --.-- --.-- 0.000 (1.359) --.-- --.-- 
0.001 
(1.525)
3.logΔ dv dece ikit ×  --.-- --.-- ---.-- --.-- --.-- 0.001 (0.701)
31log dv ik ×−  --.-- --.-- -0.002 (-1.005) --.-- --.-- 
-0.002 
(-1.300)
31log dv dece ikit ×× −  --.-- --.-- ---.-- --.-- --.-- -0.001 (-1.360)
R2-adj. 0.527 0.514 0.556 0.532 0.525 0.550 
Wald-test:  ft (3) 163.06*** 158.64*** 163.77** 171.21*** 163.06*** 163.10*** 
Wald -test:  fjt (3) 218.52** 220.33** 230.11** 232.46** 218.52** 200.41** 
Wald -test:  fi (3) 150.10*** 146.59*** 140.21*** 151.58*** 150.10*** 149.20*** 
Wald -test:  dec it × f (3) 65.12** 71.54** 68.54** 72.45** 68.27** 65.24** 
Wald (d0=d1=d2) (4) --.-- --.-- 0.543 --.-- --.-- 0.412 
LM (1st order corr.) (5) --.-- -3.541*** -3.059*** --.-- -2.541*** -2.741*** 
LM (2nd order corr.) (5) --.-- -0.664 -0.541 --.-- -0.804 -0.553 
Sargan (instr. validity) (4) --.-- 0.021 [0.995]
0.017 
[0.996] --.-- 
0.018 
[0.997] 
0.011 
[0.997]
  
   Notes: See Table 2. 
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Fourthly, the two utilization variables (i.e., industrial vehicles, itVehlogΔ , and Km-year 
driven by vehicles, itKmlogΔ ) have a positive and statistically significant impact on 
road investment. The long-term effect (see Table 4) is 0.17 and 0.05, for vehicles and 
km-year, respectively. Fifthly, political variables appear with the expected sign and two 
out of three are statistically significant. Before discussing the sign and significance of 
the variables, note that we include in the equation three different variables to measure 
each concept: the vote share of the last election held in levels ( ikvlog ) interacted with 
the period not including the first year of the mandate (d0+d1+d2), this variable in 
differences ( ikvlogΔ ) interacted with the first-year dummy (d3), and the vote share in 
levels corresponding to the previous term of office ( 1log −ikv ) interacted with the first-
year dummy. At the bottom of the table, we include a Wald test of the hypothesis H0: 
(β0-β1)=(β1-β2)=(β2-β3)=Δβ to justify the appropriateness of this specification. 
According to it, this hypothesis cannot be rejected, that is, the effect of the incumbents’ 
vote share increases steadily as the next election approaches. Also note that the 
coefficients of the variables in levels and in differences are both positive, and the 
coefficient of the lagged variable in levels is negative; all these results were expected 
(see section 3.1). 
 
Columns (5) to (7) of Table 2 repeat the estimation of the road investment equation 
allowing now for different coefficients in the two regimes (centralized and 
decentralized). This is done by including the same variables than before and these 
variables interacted with the decentralization dummy ( itdecr ). Several conclusions are 
obtained from these results. Firstly, investment does not adjust more slowly in the 
centralized than in the decentralized case. According to the interpretation given to 
expression (16), this would mean that the knowledge of the central government 
regarding the actual level of road infrastructures in a region is accurate. Secondly, we 
cannot say the same regarding the information of the central government on road needs, 
since it tends to underestimate the impact of vehicles and km-year driven on road 
requirements. This can be seen by noting that the coefficients of these variables 
interacted with the decentralization dummy are positive and statistically significant. 
Moreover, the bias seems to be considerable. In the case of vehicles, for example, the 
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coefficient in the case of centralization (the base category) is not statistically significant 
and the coefficient in the case of decentralization is eight times bigger (see Table 4). In 
the case of km-year, the coefficient under decentralization is four times bigger than 
under centralization. Thirdly, even the impact of output growth on road investment is 
bigger under decentralization than under centralization, although here the differences 
between regimes are smaller (i.e., the structural parameters are now 0.76 and 0.43, in 
the decentralization and centralization cases, respectively). Therefore, sub-central 
governments seem to be more sensitive than the central government to the additional 
road requirements created by economic growth. Fourthly, although the impact of the 
political variables also is bigger under decentralization, the coefficients of the interacted 
variables are not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
 
 
Table 4:  Effects of economic variables on desired road and education capital 
stocks in the two regimes (centralization and decentralization). Long-run 
parameters. 
 Roads Education 
 0=itdecr  1=itdecr  0=itdece  1=itdece  
rρ  0.368 (5.421)*** 
0.330 
(3.521)** --.-- --.-- 
eρ  --.-- --.-- 
0.485 
(2.451)** 
0.894 
(2.514)** 
itYlogΔ  
0.434 
(3.216)*** 
0.761 
(4.789)*** 
0.485 
(2.451)** 
0.894 
(2.514)** 
itVehlogΔ  0.052 (1.510) 
0.448 
(4.236)*** --.-- --.-- 
itKmlogΔ  
0.011 
(1.759)* 
0.043 
(4.789)*** --.-- --.-- 
itYounglogΔ  --.-- --.-- 
0.768 
(3.324)*** 
1.069 
(4.965)*** 
itYearslogΔ  --.-- --.-- 
-0.532 
(-1.541) 
-0.897 
(-4.230)*** 
 
Note: z statistics in brackets; ***=coefficient significant at the 99%, level 
**=coefficient significant at the 95% level, *=coefficient significant at the 
90% level.  
 
 
Let’s go now for the results of the estimation of the educational investment equation in 
Table 3. The organization of the table is the same than that of Table 2, and the results 
are alike. We highlight the following conclusions. Firstly, the speed of adjustment is 
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very similar to that of road investment with ρe around 0.37 (column 4) and equal across 
regimes (column 7). Secondly, the growth in the number of users and costs has a 
statistically significant impact on investment allocated to a region. The impact of the 
school-age population ( itYounglogΔ ) is positive, with a long-run impact around 0.7 
(see Table 4), while the impact of average years of schooling of the population 
( itYearslogΔ ) is negative, with a long-run impact of -0.5. According to the 
interpretation provided in section 3, this negative sign means that public and family 
inputs are substitutes in the production of human capital. The impact of these two 
variables is also stronger in the decentralization regime than in the centralization one; 
the long-run coefficients for school-age population is 1.07 and 0.77 in each of these two 
regimes; in the case of average years of education, these coefficients are -0.90 and -
0.53, respectively, and the coefficient of the centralization regime is not statistically 
significant. Thirdly, output growth also has a positive and significant impact on 
investment allocation, with a long-run parameter of 0.55, and its impact differs between 
regimes, with long-run values of 0.48 and 0.89, in the centralization and 
decentralization cases, respectively. Thus, when the regional economy grows, the 
government invests more in roads and educational facilities in the region, but much less 
in the case of the central government. Fourthly, the sign of the vote share variables is 
also the expected one, and its impact does not seem to differ between regimes. 
However, only ikvlog  appears to be statistically significant at the 90% level. These 
results suggest that roads are a better political instrument to satisfy constituencies than 
schools. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper has tested the hypothesis that sub-central governments have better 
information than the central government regarding the road and educational 
infrastructure needs of their jurisdictions. To test this hypothesis we made use of a 
unique database that provides information on road and education investment and capital 
stocks in the Spanish regions during a long period that covers both pre- and post-
decentralization years. To isolate other possible effects of decentralization on 
investment decisions we analyzed how the central and sub-central governments 
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assigned a given amount of money between two categories and across the sub-regions 
that belong to the jurisdiction of the regional government. The design of the test is 
possible because the database provides information at the NUTS-3 level while sub-
central governments in Spain (AC’s) correspond to Eurostat’s NUTS-2 regions. Making 
use of panel data techniques (i.e., introducing time × sub-central government fixed 
effects), we guarantee that the changes in investment are not due to changes in the 
overall level of resources devoted to a sub-central government as a result of the 
decentralization process. 
 
Several interesting results arise from the analysis. Firstly, road and educational 
investment made by sub-central governments in Spain is much more sensitive to 
changes in output, users and costs than the investment made by the central government. 
This suggests that the central government underestimates regional investment 
requirements. Secondly, the political cloud of a region also has some impact on the 
allocation of road and education investment, but this impact is the same both before and 
after decentralization. Thirdly, if sub-central governments are more responsive to needs 
than the central government, the composition of the capital stock under centralization is 
not efficient. That is, under centralization, too much investment in roads is made in 
some regions and too much investment in education is made in others.  
 
Note that decentralization would have eliminated this distortion. In theory, this 
efficiency cost can be measured in terms of lost output growth. To perform such a 
calculation one should simulate the alternative capital stock distribution that would have 
arisen without decentralization. Then, one should be able to compute the marginal 
productivity of road and education capital of each region, which depends on the factors 
identified in expression (6). Unfortunately, although our procedure allows us to analyze 
the effect of decentralization on efficiency, it does not provide the value of the 
technology parameters needed to compute expression (6). Probably, a non-linear 
estimation of expressions (19a) and (19b) would be necessary to carry out that task, 
which we reserve for future work. However, given the huge difference between the 
parameters of the economic variables estimated for the centralization and 
decentralization regimes, we believe that this efficiency cost might be substantial. 
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